In recent years, fairly far-reaching claims have been repeatedly made about how niche 32 construction, the modification by organisms of their environment, and that of other organisms, 33 represents a vastly neglected phenomenon in ecological and evolutionary thought. The 34 proponents of this view claim that the niche construction perspective greatly expands the scope 35 of standard evolutionary theory and that niche construction deserves to be treated as a significant 36 evolutionary process in its own right, almost at par with natural selection. Claims have also been 37 advanced about how niche construction theory represents a substantial extension to, and re-38 orientation of, standard evolutionary theory, which is criticized as being narrowly gene-centric 39 and ignoring the rich complexity and reciprocity of organism-environment interactions. We 40 examine these claims in some detail and show that they do not stand up to scrutiny. We suggest 41 that the manner in which niche construction theory is sought to be pushed in the literature is 42 better viewed as an exercise in academic niche construction whereby, through incessant 43 repetition of largely untenable claims, and the deployment of rhetorically appealing but logically 44 dubious analogies, a receptive climate for a certain sub-discipline is sought to be manufactured 45 within the scientific community. We see this as an unfortunate, but perhaps inevitable, nascent 46 post-truth tendency within science. 47 48 49 50 Key-words: niche construction; standard evolutionary theory; coevolution; natural selection; 51 philosophy of biology; post-truth. 52 53 54  "Niche construction theory is more than just an alternative perspective; it is a serious 66 body of formal evolutionary theory" (Laland et al. 2014a); 67  "...developmental bias and niche construction may be viewed as essentially the same 68 phenomena expressed inside and outside the organism" (Laland et al. 2014b); 69  "Niche construction theory explicitly recognizes environmental modification by 70 organisms ("niche construction") and their legacy over time ("ecological inheritance") 71 to be evolutionary processes in their own right" (Odling-Smee et al. 2013); and 72
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55
In recent decades, the phenomenon of niche construction (henceforth, NC) (Odling-Smee 1988) 56 has been receiving a lot of attention in the evolutionary biology literature, with many arguments 57 that a full consideration of this phenomenon as an evolutionary mechanism is a critical and 58 consequential aspect of a new, extended, evolutionary synthesis (Laland 2015; Laland et al. 59 2015) . It has been suggested that an NC perspective goes beyond the standard thinking in 60 evolutionary biology in significant ways, and that an incorporation of an NC perspective 61 necessitates a major overhaul of how we think about the evolutionary process, especially the role 62 of natural selection in promoting the evolution of adaptations (Laland 2015; Laland et al. 2014a Laland et al. , 63 b, 2015 . Just to cite a few representative examples from the last four years alone, it has been 64 claimed that: 65 6 construction on metapopulation dynamics (Hui et al. 2004; Han et al. 2009; Zhang et al. 2012) , 124 and multi-strain or multi-species population dynamics (Krakauer et al. 2009 ). 125 126 Before we proceed to our critique, let us briefly state our position on NC right at the outset. We 127 do not doubt that NC, even in a meaningfully narrower sense than used by its proponents (e.g. as 128 cogently delineated by Dawkins 2004; Brodie III 2005) , is an important and reasonably common 129 ecological phenomenon that can have interesting evolutionary consequences. We disagree, 130 however, that the phenomenon has been 'neglected' in SET, and we will argue that, on the 131 contrary, the phenomenon has been extensively incorporated in both ecological and evolutionary 132 studies for at least over a century. We also disagree with the quasi-philosophical arguments of its 133 proponents that the NC perspective "entails that niche construction be regarded as a fundamental 134 evolutionary process in its own right" (Laland et al. 2016 ), and we demonstrate the fallacies and 135 misconceptions that underlie this assertion. We trace some of these misconceptions to 136 fundamental confusions among the proponents of NCT about what the conceptual core of SET 137 actually is: they appear to conflate a narrow one-locus population genetic representation of the 138 evolutionary process with evolutionary theory. In particular, the proponents of NCT seem to be 139 completely unaware of, or at least not engaged with, quantitative genetic thinking in evolutionary 140 theory. Finally, we show that much of the published literature on NCT is not only unnecessarily 141 repetitive, and muddled biologically and philosophically, but is also historically inaccurate in 142 trying to claim a degree of originality for NCT that it just does not have. Overall, this leads us to 143 suspect that NCT is less a serious and consequential evolutionary theory and more an example of 144 academic niche construction in a nascent post-truth scientific world. 145 146 7 Niche construction has not been 'neglected' in SET 147 The proponents of NCT insist, despite criticism, on a very wide, all-encompassing definition of 148 NC (Laland et al. 2005 ). Consider, for example, the following quotes from the NCT canon: 149 "Organisms, through their metabolism, their activities, and their choices, define, partly create, 150 and partly destroy their own niches. We refer to these phenomena as niche construction" 151 and "Niche construction is the process whereby organisms, through 152 their metabolism, activities, and choices, modify their own and/or each others' niches" (Odling-153 Smee et al. 2003) . Given that everything an organism does, including living or dying, affects the 154 environment, NC would appear to be a synonym of biology, in which case, we fail to see how it 155 could be "neglected". Nevertheless, the claim that NC has been "neglected" in SET is repeatedly 156 made by the proponents of NCT, including in the eponymous sub-title of their book "Niche 157 construction: the neglected process in evolution" (Odling-Smee et al. 2003) . Even if we take a 158 narrower definition of NC, as opposed to "niche changing", as suggested by Dawkins (2004) and 159 Brodie III (2005), it is hard to agree with the claim of "neglect". Dawkins (2004) and Brodie III 160 (2005) , very correctly in our opinion, focus on the crucial issue of whether there are covariances 161 between the variants of a 'constructed' aspect of the environment, variants of heritable 162 organismal phenotypes, and the varying fitnesses of the latter. They argue that, if such 163 covariances exist, then the phenomenon should be considered niche construction and, if they do 164 not, it should be labelled niche changing, to emphasize that the environmental modification is 165 simply a by-product, not the adaptive consequence of a variant phenotype's activity (Dawkins 166 2004; Brodie III 2005) . Even with this narrower definition of NC, the argument that SET has 167 typically avoided incorporating a perspective wherein organisms can shape selection pressures, 168 8 for themselves and for other species, by altering the environment does not really stand in the face 169 of the evidence, as we shall show below. 170
171
The core of the Darwinian view of evolutionary change is the notion that the ecological struggle 172 for existence can result in evolutionary change because heredity (in the sense of parent-offspring 173 similarity) mediates the greater representation of ecologically successful variants in subsequent 174 generations (Dobzhansky 1937; Gayon 1998 ). The struggle for existence is itself a very 175 Malthusian (Malthus 1798) metaphor, premised upon the fact that increased depletion of 176 available resources by an increasing population eventually has a negative impact upon 177 population growth rates and, consequently, selects for greater competitive ability. Thus, 178 individuals alter their environment as a result of feeding and, consequently, affect the selection 179 pressures faced by themselves: in other words, a classic case of what is now labelled NC, but 180 lurking at the very heart of the foundations of SET. If NC is enshrined at the core of SET, it is a 181 bit odd to find repeated claims in the NCT literature of its neglect by SET and its practitioners. 182
Indeed, it is our submission that phenomena that are now sought to be highlighted under the label 183 of NC have been extensively incorporated into explanations of various ecological and 184 evolutionary processes for well over the last 100 years. In the fields of population and 185 community ecology, for example, the incorporation of such NC phenomena began with models 186 of density-dependent population regulation like the logistic (Quetelet 1835), alluded to above. 187 Subsequently, an NC perspective continued to be incorporated into experimental and 188 manipulative studies aimed at elucidating the biological mechanisms of density-dependent 189 population growth regulation and community structuring via competition or predation (reviewed 190 in Kingsland 1982) . 191 9 192 Another striking example of an NC perspective at the very core of SET is to be found in Fisher's 193 (1918) conceptualization of the rest of the genome, including its allelic homologue, as 194 constituting part of the environment of a focal allele at a given locus (Edwards 2014) . Indeed, 195 Fisher (1941) explicitly recognized that evolutionary change of allele frequency of the focal 196 allele due to selection typically led to a change in the environment, including the 'genomic 197 environment', in a manner that altered fitness of and, therefore, selection pressures on, the focal 198 allele (discussed in Frank 1995) . For example, consider the simple case of a one-locus, two-allele, 199 viability selection model with over-dominance for fitness (i.e.  12 > 11 , 22 where  11 ,  12 and 200  22 are the fitnesses of the A 1 A 1 , A 1 A 2 and A 2 A 2 genotypes, respectively). Here, the steady state is 201 a stable equilibrium allele frequency. Suppose the allele frequency of allele A 1 , say p 1 , is less 202 than the equilibrium value p 1 * . In that case, in the next generation, p 1 will increase. This increase 203 automatically reduces the frequency of the allele A 2 (p 2 = 1-p 1 ), which in Fisher's (1918 Fisher's ( , 1941 view is an alteration of the environment, resulting in a reduction of the marginal allelic fitness of 205 A 1 (marginal allelic fitness of A 1 = p 1  11 + p 2  12 ). Thus, the very increase of p 1 as a result of 206 selection (differential fitnesses of the three genotypes) in itself affects the genomic environment 207 at that locus and results in a reduction of the rate of increase of p 1 . This is an excellent example 208 of the kind of nuanced thinking about organism (in this case, allele) to environment feedbacks, 209 resulting in an alteration of selection pressures, that NCT proponents claim is lacking in SET and, 210 once again, it is found at the very heart of "gene-centric" SET. 211 212 Shifting our attention to theoretical studies of slightly more ecologically rich phenomena in 213 evolution, like speciation, we again find a nuanced NC-like perspective even in studies firmly 214 10 within the gene-centric SET framework, conducted by people who would have defined 215 themselves as firmly within the SET tradition. Consider the class of population genetic models of 216 sympatric speciation, which began with Maynard Smith's (1966) eponymous paper, and are 217 reviewed by Gavrilets (2006) . In these models, the fitnesses of genotypes at a locus vary 218 depending on which sub-habitat or niche is chosen by an organism. Such choice of habitat, 219 incidentally, is considered to be NC by its proponents (Odling-Smee et al. 2003) . In this set of 220 models, choice of sub-habitat is arbitrarily fixed as a parameter and not modelled as being 221 determined by genotypes at a locus, because the focus of the models is on the evolution of 222 mating preferences. Similar models of host-choice evolution and sympatric speciation (e.g. 223
Rausher 1984; Diehl and Bush 1989) have also been developed in which host choice is 224 determined by genotypes at a preference locus, with the choice of host then determining fitnesses 225 based on genotypes at a performance locus. Treating fitnesses on hosts 1 and 2 as conceptually 226 the same as their being two separate traits (Falconer 1960) , if there is antagonistic pleiotropy for 227 fitness on alternative hosts, it drives epistasis for fitness between the preference and performance 228 loci. If host preference in these models is specifically for oviposition, then the epistasis is trans-229 generational between maternal preference genotype and offspring performance genotype. All 230 these models, thus, incorporate a very nuanced treatment of organisms affecting the selection 231 pressures they (or their offspring) face through their choice of host or sub-habitat, something that 232 the proponents of NCT maintain is generally missing in studies done within the SET framework. 233
234
If we switch our focus to empirical studies, we find that here, too, what is today called the NC 235 perspective has actually been quite pervasive. In the relatively simplistic context of controlled- The point we wish to stress is that the authors of all these studies have undertaken a very 255 nuanced approach to understanding the selection pressures facing populations of Drosophila in 256 cultures subjected to larval crowding in various ways. Their approach includes an explicit 257 incorporation of the manner in which the activities of the larvae alter the environment and how 258 that, in turn, modifies the selection pressures they face. These selection pressures then, in turn, 259 interact with other specific aspects of the environment to result in varying evolutionary 260 trajectories across studies. The results of many such studies linking demography, life-history, 261 adaptations to crowding and population dynamics are reviewed by Mueller et al. (2005) . We 262 emphasize here that all these authors would place themselves squarely within the SET tradition 263 and they have accomplished their analyses of a complex interplay between organism and 264 environment in an evolutionary context without recourse to the specific conceptualizations or 265 terminology of NCT. These examples, to our minds, are particularly striking because these are 266 studies conducted within the laboratory selection paradigm, a scenario most likely to 267 approximate the criticism of neglecting organism-to-environment-to-selection feedback that is 268 routinely levelled against practitioners of SET by the proponents of NCT. 269
270
If one shifts focus from laboratory selection studies to studies of evolutionary phenomena in wild 271 populations, the NC perspective is even more pervasive, although without the use of the NC 272 label. As Thompson (1994) has detailed, a nuanced and detailed appreciation of how interacting 273 organisms shape each others' selection pressures and evolution is apparent even in the earliest 274 late-nineteenth century studies of flower-pollinator coevolution and mimicry, some of the first 275 attempts to understand diversity through the lens of natural selection. Indeed, the vast number of 276 studies in the broad area of coevolution are suffused with the kind of appreciation of how subtle 277 the reciprocal interactions between organisms and their biotic and abiotic environments are, and 278 how they shape coevolutionary trajectories, that NCT proponents claim is generally missing in 279 studies within the framework of SET. These studies encompass varied ecological and 280 evolutionary nuances of species interactions ranging from competition to mutualism, including 281 various aspects of predation, grazing and parasitism. This huge body of work is discussed in 282 detail by Thompson (1994 Thompson ( , 2005 Thompson ( , 2013 ) and we will not dwell on it further. To sum up, we believe that the claim by proponents of NCT that NC and ecological inheritance 331 have been neglected in evolutionary biology research carried out under the framework of SET is 332 not tenable. On the contrary, the kind of nuanced appreciation of how organisms shape their 333 abiotic and biotic environments and, thereby, the selection pressures they face, which the 334 proponents of NCT claim to be largely missing from work done in the SET framework, is 335 actually ubiquitous in such work. Such a nuanced appreciation of the interactive nature of 336 ecological relationships is abundantly reflected in mainstream evolutionary biological work right 337 from the time of Darwin and Haeckel (Gayon 1998; Richards 2008) , through the decades of the 338 crystallization of SET in the early twentieth century (Gayon 1998) , and well into present times 339 (Thompson 1994 (Thompson , 2005 (Thompson , 2013 . Moreover, this nuanced appreciation of the richness of ecological 340 relationships, and its deployment in evolutionary explanation, is seen in a priori 'gene-centric' 341 theory, in theory slightly more responsive to ecological realities, whether in the laboratory or the 342 wild, and in empirical studies on laboratory or wild populations and communities. Given all the 343 examples quoted above, and there are countless more for each claim that we could not quote for 344 want of space, our question to the proponents of NCT is: What exactly has been neglected by 345 SET that NCT claims to incorporate? 346 347 NCT models do not constitute an 'extensive body of formal theory' 348 Here, we first briefly discuss three early and often cited models of niche construction that have 349 been described as extending the understanding possible through SET and also as constituting an 350 extensive body of formal theory (Laland et al. 2016 ) (these models are further discussed at 351 length in Appendix 1). We then touch upon some other theoretical developments in NCT. Two 352 16 of the three early models (Laland et al. , 1999 The main point we wish to make is that the results of these models are neither surprising nor 393 unexpected in the context of SET. Two (or more) locus models with pleiotropic and epistatic 394 effects on fitness, with or without time lags, are well known within gene-centric SET to yield 395 outcomes and dynamics that can differ from simpler, similar models without epistasis (Hartl and 396 Clark 1989) . Indeed, gene-by-gene interactions, whether within-or between-loci, can yield 397 18 seemingly unexpected results, even without time-lags. For example, under-dominance for fitness 398 at one locus can, seemingly paradoxically, result in the fixation of a sub-optimal phenotype due 399 to initial conditions fortuitously being what they were, unlike what is possible in a one-locus 400 model of viability selection without under-dominance. We do not believe that it therefore follows 401 that under-dominance is a major evolutionary process in its own right, or that a few models of 402 over-dominance and under-dominance need to be elevated to the status of a major evolutionary 403 theory to be set up in competition to SET. Essentially, the 'formal theory' pertaining to models of 404 the evolutionary consequences of niche construction rests upon the demonstration that, because 405 niche construction can induce time-lagged epistasis for fitness, it can result in evolutionary 406 outcomes that are unexpected in the context of simpler population genetic models lacking such 407 time-lagged epistatic effects. This does not in any way supersede SET, unless one implicitly 408 defines SET as taking no cognizance of gene-by-gene interactions. 409
410
In addition to the three models we discuss in the appendix (Laland et al. , 1999 (Laland et al. , 2001 practitioners of SET. We frankly fail to understand how or why we are expected to acknowledge 420 19 this handful of models as an extensive body of formal theory that somehow significantly 421 supersedes or, at least significantly extends, SET. These papers taken together would not even 422 compare favourably with one SET paper, that of Fisher (1918) logically at par with natural selection in terms of its importance to 'causal' evolutionary 437 explanations of adaptation (Laland 2015) . One somewhat unique characteristic of the literature 438 on NC is that the same few conceptual arguments are repeatedly made, in very similar words, in 439 multiple publications. Consequently, to avoid having to keep referencing multiple papers that say 440 almost the same things, we focus our critique of these quasi-philosophical claims on their most 441 recent detailed exposition (Laland 2015) . 442 443 20 Essentially, these claims are premised upon the argument that the process of adaptive evolution 444 has two major steps: the generation of variation and the sorting of this variation such that the 445 frequency of better adapted variants increases. This is an old and venerable view, going back at 446 least to Bateson (1894) and De Vries (1909) , and also articulated in some detail in recent times 447 by Endler (1986) . We agree with this depiction of the adaptive evolutionary process. Laland 448 (2015) argues that phenomena acting at the first of these two steps have not typically been 449 regarded as 'evolutionary processes', whereas phenomena acting at the second step, such as 450 natural selection, have. Laland (2015) further traces the roots of this distinction between 451 evolutionary processes like selection on the one hand, and background conditions that alter the 452 form of selection, or the extent of variation available to selection, on the other, to Mayr's (1961) 453 distinction between proximate and ultimate causes in biological explanation. Specifically, Laland 454 (2015) argues that background conditions, such as niche construction or developmental bias, that 455 shape the specific instantiation of a (proximal) causal process like selection should not be 456 neglected as causal processes. We believe that Laland (2015) misses the point that natural 457 selection is an ultimate cause when thinking of a phenotype, but a proximate cause when 458 thinking of change in the composition of a population with regard to the variants it contains. For 459 example, if one is interested in the differences in beak shape among the various species of 460
Darwin's finches on the Galapagos islands, natural selection is invoked as an ultimate cause, 461
whereas the proximate cause(s) are to be sought in the ontogeny of beak development in the 462 different species. However, if one is trying to understand why average beak length in a given 463 species of Darwin's finch changes due to, say, a drought, then a specific instance of natural 464 selection constitutes a proximate cause. Thus, the proximate-ultimate distinction in this context is 465 really a red herring, because whether natural selection is a proximate or an ultimate cause 466 21 depends upon what exactly is sought to be explained. Essentially, natural selection is as much a 467 proximate cause of evolutionary change as developmental-physiological mechanisms are 468 proximate causes of a phenotype. It is not clear to us why the proponents of NCT consider 469 proximate causes to be very important when thinking of phenotypes, but not when thinking of 470 evolutionary change as the phenomenon whose various causes are to be delineated. Indeed, the 471 relevant literature by NCT proponents gets fairly muddled on this point. The real issue is actually 472 the contrast between a phenomenon acting at the 'sorting of variation' stage and one acting at the 473 'generation of variation' stage. 474
475
As stated above, Laland (2015) argues that background conditions that shape the specific 476 instantiation of a (proximal) causal process like selection should not themselves be neglected as 477 causal processes. In a very broad sense, we do not disagree that background conditions can affect 478 the nature of the outcome of a proximate causal process and, in that sense, considering 479 background conditions can add to the richness of an explanation. However, this added richness is 480 often of a specific and narrow kind. We will elaborate upon this point using Laland's (2015) 481 analogy of a murder trial in which he writes, "we would not be optimistic about the chances of 482 the defendant in the dock receiving a 'not guilty' verdict if their defence was based on the 483 argument that they did not cause the death of the victim that they shotthat was the bulletthey 484 only pulled the trigger". In this analogy, the evolutionary change is the death of the victim, the 485 bullet is natural selection, and the defendant deciding to pull the trigger is the background 486 condition shaping the specific form that selection took in this particular instantiation. The 487 argument deployed by Laland (2015) is that the judge, presumably representing an enlightened 488 NC theorist, will give more, or equal, importance to the background condition as compared to 489 22 selection. However, the analogy is actually flawed because the judge in this example is 490 specifically tasked with ascertaining human agencyhis or her brief is to ascertain whether the 491 defendant is guilty of the murder or not. In the mapping of this analogy on to the evolutionary 492 process, there is no equivalent of the need to establish agency. Evolutionary theory attempts an 493 explanation of the process of adaptive evolution, and steers clear of any requirement of 494 establishing agency for one or another process. Once the consideration of establishing agency is 495 removed, and the focus is on the facts of the case, as would be the situation for evolutionary 496 theory, the situation becomes quite different from that presented by Laland (2015) : an autopsy 497 report, which is not concerned with agency and is therefore the appropriate analogue of 498 evolutionary theory in this example, will simply record the cause of death as a bullet wound 499 suffered by the victim! 500 501
The error implicit in conflating the logical causal status of proximate causal processes and 502 background conditions can be seen clearly using a different analogy, also used to great effect by 503
Darwin (quoted at length in Gayon 1998, pgs. 52-53) . The designing and construction of a 504 building is constrained first by the laws of physics and, secondarily, by the availability of 505 materials due to accessibility or finances or both. But within these background constraints, 506 architects and their style of architecture exert great influence on the final form that the building 507 takes. Laland's (2015) argument is essentially a plea for giving equal importance to the laws of 508 physics and material availability on the one hand, and the design of the architect on the other, as 509 an explanation of the final form of a building. While not denying the role of the background 510 conditions, we would suggest that the proximate cause of the architect's design has far greater 511 explanatory power in explaining the final form of the building, as compared to the background 512 23 conditions. That is why, despite the laws of physics, the use of white marble as the primary 513 construction material, and even the raison d'être, being the same in both cases, the Lincoln 514 Memorial in Washington DC and the Taj Mahal in Agra do not look particularly similar: the 515 differences arise from one being designed in the Doric style and the other in the Indo-Persian 516 style. 517
518
The second aspect of Laland's (2015) conflation of NC and selection as causal evolutionary 519 processes that we disagree with stems from our distinction between a phenomenon per se and the 520 conditions that cause the phenomenon to occur in a particular manner in a specific instantiation 521 of that phenomenon. Natural selection is a phenomenon that results from the sorting of variants 522 such that the frequency of better adapted variants increases. NC is a phenomenon that can shape 523 the manner in which selection acts in any particular case and, thereby, affect precisely which 524 variants end up increasing or decreasing in frequency as a result of selection. These two 525 phenomena are clearly not of the same type with regard to their roles in the adaptive evolutionary 526 process. NC affects the way in which selection acts. Its role is thus of a modifier which affects 527 how a certain category of evolutionary process acts in a given instantiation, whereas selection 528 has a very different logical or epistemic status as a specific category of process. We see the 529 attempts to join NC with developmental bias (Laland et al. 2008 (Laland et al. , 2014b Laland 2015, 16) as an 530 essentially flawed attempt to make this joint phenomenon appear more important than NC alone, 531 because conflating the two also gives the joint phenomenon a double role in affecting the 532 'generation of variation' step as well as mediating the specific instantiation of selection in the 533 'sorting of variation' step. Nevertheless, it does not alter the fact that it both cases, it is a specific 534 instantiation of selection that is being altered by NC or development bias. 535 24 536
To sum up, although we agree that both the generation and sorting of variants are important parts 537 of the overall process of adaptive evolution, we do not agree that NC/developmental bias have a 538 logical or epistemic status in explanations of adaptive evolution equivalent to that of natural 539 selection. In the context of adaptive evolutionary change, natural selection is the proximate cause 540 of changes in population composition and is, therefore, a general principle rather than a 541 phenomenon that exists as a specific instantiation of a general principle. Consequently, the 542 position or status of natural selection in explanations of adaptive evolution is epistemically 543 distinct from that of phenomena that either constrain the range of variation that selection sorts, or 544 that modulate which variants selection happens to sort for in a given scenario. Proponents of NCT make a few claims repeatedly: (i) NC and ecological inheritance have been 559 neglected; (ii) there is a vast body of formal theory on NC and its ecological and evolutionary 560 consequences that is a significant addition to SET; and (iii) NC and, more recently, 561 NC/developmental bias are important evolutionary processes at par with natural selection in the 562 context of explaining adaptive evolution. These claims are repeated, often in similar language 563 and with the same examples and analogies, in paper after paper. Indeed, examining the fairly 564 voluminous literature on NCT after the book by Odling-Smee et al. (2003) , we find that hardly 565 anything new has been said, with the exception of the more recent claims that developmental 566 bias and niche construction are conceptually two sides of the same coin (Laland et al. 2008; 567 2014b; Laland 2015, 2016). Characteristically, even this claim has been repeated multiple times 568 over the past several years, without any new arguments or facts being deployed to bolster it. 569 570 As we have argued here, we believe the facts clearly suggest that the first two claims are just 571 plain wrong. We wonder whether that is why they need so much repetition. The third claim, we 572 have argued here, is based on philosophically muddled thinking and inappropriate analogies. 573
Thus, we believe that the scientific case being made by the proponents of NCT is weak, and their 574 work and perspective is being sought to be made to appear far more novel, revolutionary and 575 consequential than it really is. It is this latter point that we find disturbing and, more importantly, 576 detrimental to the way in which science is done. Incessant repetition of claims that do not stand 577 up to critical scrutiny, an avoidance of specifically responding to particular criticisms in favour 578 of diffuse and generalized responses, and the deployment of dubious analogies are all aspects of 579 rhetoric that are unfortunately becoming familiar worldwide in what is often being described as a 580 post-truth world. We are dismayed that they have also made an entry into the scientific discourse 581 26 and that is why we wonder whether this constant pushing of untenable claims regarding NCT is 582 actually an instantiation of academic niche construction. 583 584 Acknowledgments 585 This is contribution no. 2 from the Foundations of Genetics and Evolution Group (FOGEG). 586
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